Licensing of Signpainters
Declared Unconstitutional
Paralegals take on the 
                  City of Tulsa and win in state Supreme Court
 "Ordinances requiring 
                  all sign painters to be licensed and to obtain permit for each 
                  sign painted
were unconstitutional." 
                  - Priddy v City of Tulsa, 882 P.2nd 81 (Okl.CR.1914)
    In a Landmark decision, 
                  which will have far-reaching ramifications nationaly, the criminal division 
                  of Oklahoma's Supreme Court declared the licensing ordinances 
                  of the City of Tulsa, as they aply to sign painters, unconstitutional. 
                  on Sept. 26, 1994 in the case of Priddy v City of Tulsa, 882 
                  P.2nd 81 (Okl.CR.1914), the Court of criminal appeals ruled 
                  that "the vocation of painting signs does not imply any sinister 
                  effect on the public requiring municipal surveillance in the 
                  form of a license." The laws of this case are germane to any 
                  municipality that compels any individual to be licensed in order 
                  to earn a living as a sign-painter.
 In 1993, Christopher A. 
                  Priddy, a freelance signpainter, was convicted of the "crime" 
                  of not having a sign contractor's license nor a permit to paint 
                  a sign. Priddy was originally arraigned in Tulsa Municipal Court 
                  on the charge of having "no permit for work performed" under 
                  Title 51 2901.5 (see foot note for full text) of the Tulsa Building 
                  Code.
 After arraignment, the city prosecutor filed a motion amending 
                  the complaint, to add the offense of having "no license to engage 
                  in business as a sign contracter" under Section 2906.1. On appeal, 
                  the Supreme Court ruled the trial court erred and violated the 
                  state constitution and statutes in permitting the amended motion 
                  without requiring or allowing an arraignment on the new charge. 
                  
Without leagal reprensentation, Priddy filed a substantial motion 
                  and brief to dismiss, disputing the constitutionality of the 
                  city sign ordinance.The procecution argued not only could the 
                  city require a license to paint signs, it could also regulate 
                  aesthetics. Amazingly, Judge William J. Hiddle agreed, claiming 
                  the regulation of asthetics was just as resonable as regulating 
                  littering and promptly overruled Priddy's motion, cauusing the 
                  trial to progress on its merits.
 During the trial Priddy maintained that 
                  the city had failed to provide sufficient proof he was holding 
                  himself up as a sign contractor. In what Judge Hiddle blithlly 
                  described as a "Perry Mason" move, assistant city attorney Steve 
                  Porter introduced photographic evidence from Priddy's own exhibits, 
                  depicting painted signs on Priddy's pickup truck, advertising 
                  "witness Designs." With a gottcha attitude, Hiddle declared 
                  that, until then, Priddy had the case won. Upon conviction, 
                  Priddy immediately filed his intent to appeal under the relatively 
                  new "fast track" docket procedures now in place in Oklahoma.
 
                  Sounding the A.L.A.R.M. 
Enter Craig Buis. Eight years earlier, 
                  after numerous clashes with Tulsa sign inspectors, Buis and 
                  fellow sign painter Steve Kukla began to actively study the 
                  Constitution and apply legal procedures as a means of challenging 
                  illogical and intrusive sign regulations. Their efforts produced 
                  minimal results until Buis and Kukla established the Tulsa chapter 
                  of the Action League of America's Reasonable Majority (A.L.A.R.M.) 
                  This informed citizen's paralegal group is dedicated to assisting 
                  people involved in legal disputes, especially with government 
                  entities. 
Buis quickly came to Priddy's aid, enlisting A.L.A.R.M.'s 
                  team of researchers to master-mind Priddy's appeal and brief 
                  to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeal. After months of intensive 
                  research and preparation, Buis and Priddy were ready to have 
                  some fun. On August 18, 1994, Priddy appeared, without an attorney, 
                  before the high tribunal in Oklahoma City to present his written 
                  and oral argument to a panel of five judges. (One justice was 
                  absent, but he could later review the record should the decision 
                  result in a tie.) 
Normally a very quiet and gentle soul, Priddy 
                  vigorously presented 10 minutes of a prepared oral argument, 
                  with frequent interruptions for questions and observations from 
                  the justices. The Court's inquiries focused on one's inalienable 
                  right to pursue an occupation without undue interference from 
                  any level of government.
 As Porter presented the City's response, 
                  a barrage of probing querries and comments flew hot and heavy 
                  from the Court, so much so that, at one point, Judge Johnson 
                  had to assure Porter the Court wasn't really "picking on him," 
                  that it was just Porter's unfortunate task to represent the 
                  City of Tulsa that day. 
Asked if he believed there was " any human endeavor" 
                  which the City of Tulsa did not have the right to regulate, 
                  Porter took a drawn out pause and answered in the negative, 
                  generating instant vexation from more than one justice. When 
                  Chief Justice Gary Lumpkin directed Porter's attention to the 
                  Wiggensjost case sited in Priddy's appeal brief, Porter replied 
                  that the 1936 case was old. Unimpressed with this response, 
                  the court pressed him further. Flustered by this line of questioning 
                  Porter couldn't effectively reply. 
Regulation or Tax? 
Like most 
                  cities, Tulsa ushered in it's signpainter licensing under the 
                  guise of a regulatory law, not as a taxing ordinance for the 
                  purpose of raising revenue. As Priddy revealed at trial, the 
                  High Court determined that Tulsa's ordinance, as adopted, was 
                  overly broad, vague and monetarily intrusive. Additionally, 
                  it did not fulfill it's intended purpose of insuring the health, 
                  safety and wellfare of the general public. 
As such, the ordinance 
                  ruled an obvious revenue scheme, which violated the rights of 
                  the "class of law-abiding individuals engaged in the vocation 
                  of lettering pre-existing and previously city permitted sign 
                  structures". Also, "the cost in providing for the enforcement 
                  of combined regalatory and licensing schemes exceed what is 
                  required to vacilitate compliance." 
As a signpainter, Priddy 
                  was required by the city of Tulsa to pay an annual license fee 
                  of $150. As for insurance policies, the city mandated his having 
                  $25,000 for public liability/property damage, $50,000 for personal 
                  injury and death, $5,000 for property damage and a $2,000 surety 
                  bond. Oh yes, and there was also the sign permit and a $25,000 
                  removal bond. 
The Oklahoma tribunal declared that when anyone 
                  engaged "in the business of signpainting, without qualification, 
                  is able to obtain a license simply upon payment of a specified 
                  sum to do business, and is not subject to a prescribed rule 
                  of conduct, the presumption is strong that the power of taxation 
                  and not police power is being exercised". The Court also noted 
                  the ordinance appeared to only stable, established signpainters 
                  who have a permanent address and telephone number, not to itinerant signpainters. 
                  As it's primary authority for holding the Tulsa ordinace unconstitutional, 
                  the Court sited State v. Wiggensjost 130 Neb 450, 265 N.W.422 
                  (1936), as well as various "licensure" provisions of Amerian 
                  Jurisprudence and Corpus Juris Secundum. In Wiggensjost, the 
                  Nebraska Supreme Court found the license feature of a sign ordinance, 
                  which was required in addition to a permit was not enforceable. 
                  The Oklahoma Court agreed with the nebraska Court that one's 
                  right to acquire the means to supporting life by honest labor 
                  and skill is an inherent right, and the vocation of painting 
                  signs confers no threat to the public that requires municipal 
                  surveillance in the form a license. 
Going To Far
 In It's written 
                  decision, the Court said, "We can understand the desirability 
                  of each municipality requiring a permit before a sign is authorized. 
                  However, if each municipality requires a permit for each sign 
                  and then requires the signpainter to also be licensed to paint 
                  signs within that municipality, the ability of a signpainter 
                  to practice his trade will be gravely restricted. We find it 
                  would be highly unreasonable and overly burdensome for a sign 
                  painter to be required to be licensed in each municipality in 
                  which the sign painter might find work...." 
Although the Court 
                  recognized Tulsa's power to enact and enforce ordinances to 
                  protect the public peace, order, health, morals and safety of 
                  its citizens, and establish licencing requirements it deems 
                  appropriate in the exercise of its police power, it adjudged 
                  the City of Tulsa was unable to show that "sign painting" might 
                  be injurious to the public health, peace or morals so as to 
                  require regulating and supervision, nor could the City justify 
                  to the Court how the public welfare of Tulsa was enhanced by 
                  requiring both a license and a permit. For a municipality "to 
                  sustain encroachment on an indivdual's liberty, there must be 
                  an obvious and real connection between the ordinance and its 
                  purpose to protect the public welfare..." [see Cryan v. State, 
                  583 P.2d 1122(Okl.Cr.1978)]. 
The Court agreed with Priddy "that 
                  the City Ordinance under which he was convicted," Sections 2906.1 
                  and 201.0 (see footnotr) of Title 51, " as it applied to sign 
                  painters, is unconstitutional. Further, we find...Section 2901.5 
                  (see footnote), insofar as it requires a license for sign painters 
                  in addition to a permit, is unconstitutional."
 In addition, 
                  the Court declared as "legally invalid" the prosecutor's claim 
                  that Tulsa's sign ordinance has a legitimate role in insuring 
                  some arbitrary and undefined aesthetic function, that the trial 
                  court erred in determining such a function was a legitimate 
                  one "for purposes of licensing persons who merely letter privately 
                  owned signs," notwithstanding the fact the ordinance imposed 
                  no standard or guide for its enforcement, which granted uncontrolled 
                  discretion to the enforcing officals. The trial court also erred 
                  in not allowing Priddy to prove these lack of standards and 
                  uncontrolled enforcement. 
Signpainting Only
 It must be emphasized 
                  the Court's ruling declaring Tulsa's licensing ordinances as 
                  "unconstitutional" is relevant only as they apply to sign painters, 
                  and the findings of the Court are narrowly limited to signpainting, 
                  not to the erection, removal or the aesthetics of the sign, 
                  etc. 
For years, signpainters have hotly debated and cursed dictatorial 
                  sign codes, excessive fees and unreasonable government regulations 
                  and intrusions reguarding their craft. The Priddy case is an 
                  imprortant legal decision in support of the rights of signpainters, 
                  and a valuable weapon to defend their right to pursue and perform 
                  their calling without harassment from a municipal "Big Brother". 
                  Regardless of what city or state in which a signpainter exercises 
                  his lettering skills, the axioms of Priddy v. City of Tulsa 
                  are applicable to any municipality that requires a citizen to 
                  be licensed in order to make a living as a signpainter.
**foot note
Tulsa's 
                  Unconstitutional Code 
The following is the text portions of 
                  the Tulsa sign ordinance, which has been declared unconstitutionl 
                  by the Oklahoma Supreme Court. 
Secton 2901.5: Permits Required: 
                  No sign shall be erected, altered or relocated without a permit 
                  issuedby the code official, except as otherwise provided herein. 
                  Where electrical permits are required, they shall be obtained 
                  at the same time as the sign permit. No permit required for 
                  any sign work shall be issued, and no sign for which such a 
                  permit is required shall be erected unless the person, firm 
                  or corporation erecting the same shall have paid the current 
                  license fee as herein provided and shall have executed and delivered 
                  a bond and insurance as herein provided... 
Section 2906.1: License: 
                  No person, firm or corporation shall be issued a permit or engaged 
                  or offer to engage in, by advertisement or otherwise, a business 
                  as a sign contractor untill such person, firm or corporation 
                  has secured a license and has paid an annual fee of One Hundred 
                  Fifty Dollars ($150.00) thereor, has provided evidence of insurance 
                  and has posted the bond as required herein."
 Section 201.0:Sign 
                  Contractor: Any person, firm or corporation engaged in the business 
                  of manufacrurion, assembling, transporting, installing, erecting, 
                  repairing, painting, altering, servicing, or removing signs 
                  as herein defined, and maintaining permanent business address 
                  or telephone. 

        
See what the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
has to say about this.